Climate and Conflict: How Climate Vulnerabilities are Driving Violence

By Elizabeth Dykstra-McCarthy

Governments worldwide are bracing themselves to adapt to a new environment and its challenges. Some impacts are direct or self-evident; rising sea levels will lead to loss of homes, displacement and climate refugees. Other impacts are much less clear, such as climate conflicts.  The jury is still out on the strength of the correlation between the impacts of climate change and human conflict. However, a growing body of literature suggests that as communities are forced to adapt – to pressures on resources like land, water and food, or as climate change threatens our critical infrastructure for energy and security – conflicts will increase.  There is no typical climate conflict, and it would be simplistic to suggest that climate change will lead to war; but as society reacts to the pressures brought on by climate change, tensions that had been simmering, may erupt.

What does a climate conflict look like?

Nigeria is on the frontline of climate change impacts. In the north, desertification and wind erosion in the Sudano-Sahelian zone, and in the south, a threatened coastline. As the Sahara Desert advances southwards at almost a mile per year, the farmers and herders of the north are pushed closer together and further south. As they do so, ecological degradation increased is exacerbated. Deforestation and increased water usage, alongside short, volatile rainy seasons, has have increased erosion, reduced grazing foliage and pastures and diminished crop yields. Climate vulnerability is extreme.

A conflict between the Fulani pastoralists and Christian farmers has been fomenting in Northern Nigeria for over a decade, claiming more civilians lives than the 2018 Boko Haram insurgency. The ecological degradation along the Sahel has forced the Fulani pastoralists to shift their annual migrations from traditional paths, further south into Nigeria. Access to land and water resources is more limited, and the migration has brought the pastoralists into contact with new clans, with different resources, customs and languages. This has entrenched farmer-herder divisions and mistrust. The competition over natural resources is further enflamed by ethnic tensions and religious differences; tensions which had not been tested until these climate shocks .

Why does this conflict matter?

This conflict caused 1,300 deaths in the first three months of 2018 alone and displaced 300,000. If the human cost isn’t sufficient, it has cost the country nearly $14 billion, at a time when climate change impacts and oil price fluctuations are already hampering Nigeria’s economic growth. Should the Delta flood and threaten oil fields, government resources to respond to any crisis (including climate change) would be slashed. According to a Mercy Corps report, Nigeria would stand to gain up to $14 billion annually in total macroeconomic progress if peace were maintained in the four Middle Belt states alone. Instability in Nigeria is more than just a cause for concern for Nigeria alone. Nigeria contains 50% of the population of West Africa.  Ripples of instability, whether of conflict or economic, will spread outwards across the region from this epicentre.

An armed Fulani pastoralist monitors his cattle. Image source: iNSAMER

An armed Fulani pastoralist monitors his cattle. Image source: iNSAMER

Is this all due to the climate crisis?

No conflict is caused by one factor alone and ecological degradation should not become the scapegoat for the failures of political leadership and governance.[1] The rhetoric of religious leaders and media has couched the violence in regional, religious and ethnic terms and played upon pre-existing tensions. Nigeria’s constitution has differentiated between Muslims and Christians to limit access to natural resources and public goods (such as education and employment opportunities) exacerbating much of the worst violence. As with almost all critical issues in the climate crisis, it is not the rising temperatures and changing weather alone which will cause the most disastrous consequences, but societal reactions to them. Research has indicated that the climatic shock itself; forcing societies and communities to change their behaviour and livelihoods because of the environment changing around them, is what causes the conflict.

What solutions have been tried?

The erosion of community ties and traditional relationships removed any space or channel for dialogue when disputes arose. Previously, a taxation system for both farmers and herders had generated revenue for the region and instilled a sense of belonging, and responsibility for each other’s assets. Tribal leaders had developed conflict mitigation mechanisms to compensate losses and share resources; these mechanisms disappeared with the loss of clan leadership. Instead, the national and local governments have exacerbated farmer-pastoralist frictions through top-down policies and expanded military interventions, rather than addressing the conflict’s root drivers, both climate and otherwise.

Alternatives conflict resolution methods are available, such as creating forums integrating governmental and traditional leaders to identify early warning signs, resolve ongoing conflicts, and mainstream these strategies into national and regional development. Increasingly conflict resolution organisations worldwide are addressing environmental factors but none have as yet been applied in northern Nigeria.

What solutions remain on the table?

Combatting desertification is key to  relieving pressures on pastoral and arable land. 76% of Nigeria’s population rely on wood fuel, propelling severe deforestation. Programs to increase alternative energy sources (such as solar) would decelerate deforestation rates and increase rural resilience and energy security. Reforestation would be critical in improving soil health and reducing desertification. Natural regeneration of the land has significant co-benefits; such as providing food security, employment and increasing industries (such as palm oil plantations). The AU and the UNCCD launched the Green Belt Project, a wide belt of vegetation which could prove critical and, although Nigeria signed the UNCCD in 1994, its commitment has proved low.

The Green Belt Project includes sustainable, climate-resilient agricultural practices for natural land regeneration:

·      reviving plant and tree roots

·      digging “half-moon” pits to store water

·      replacing artificial fertilizer with ecological engineering (like flower-crop rotation).

In Niger, these methods have restored 5 million hectares of land and around 200 million trees. A full commitment to the Green Belt and renewable energy projects could have seismic effects on regional desertification. 

Map of the Great Green Wall/Green Belt Initiative. Image Source: National Geographic

Map of the Great Green Wall/Green Belt Initiative. Image Source: National Geographic

Tackling climate conflicts requires an interdisciplinary approach; sustainable practices alongside conflict resolution. Conflict-sensitive adaptation, through natural resource management and cooperative governance strategies, should: build inter-community trust; integrate traditional leaders in decision-making and dispute resolution; and develop inclusive platforms.

We can only guess at the long-term impacts of climate change on our societies, though few of the guesses are optimistic. It seems increasingly clear that the greater pressure on resources, the sudden shift in livelihoods, the threats to infrastructure and society, will make conflict more likely. Though northern Nigeria may seem a world away, the lessons we can learn from it are not. 


Elizabeth Dykstra-MCcarthy is a MALD student, focusing on Environmental Research and Policy and Development Economics. Her research centers around the human rights and development challenges of the renewable energy transition, such as indigenous rights, energy poverty, transition minerals and environmental waste. She is the co-chair for the Tufts Energy Conference and currently also working for the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre and the Woodwell Climate Research Center. 

Climate Policy Lab